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Shared Governance and Academic Bargaining 
Neil Bucklew,1 Christopher Ellison,2 Jeffery D. Houghton3  
 
Introduction 
Works councils and codetermination processes are gaining an increased foothold on 
a global basis. Much of the groundbreaking developments can be traced to Germany in 
the 1920’s. Many other European countries have adapted to the use of these systems in 
recent decades. Indeed, the European Union has mandated similar processes since the 
1990s. These worker involvement systems have spread around the globe with significant 
activity in Asia and South America as key examples. 
A glaring omission from this movement has been the United States. Much of this 
lack of development can be traced to the structure of US labor law. The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits employers from dominating or interfering with the 
formation or administration of any labor organization (e.g., a union). This prohibition, 
deemed an unfair labor practice under the act, reflects a public policy concern at the time 
the NLRA was passed. This concern was based on the belief that employers should not be 
able to create a “company union” and therefore undermine the creation of independent 
worker controlled organizations (e.g., unions). The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) has maintained a relatively strict interpretation of this prohibition and courts 
have upheld the NLRB positions. Employer development of works councils in the 
European style have remained a prohibited practice under US labor law. Statutory 
attempts to modify this restriction have been unsuccessful. 
A major exception to this prohibition in the United States can be found in academic 
collective bargaining in institutions of higher education. There are over 4500 colleges and 
universities in the United States with over 1,000,000 faculty and a significant number of 
other professional level employees. Academic collective bargaining is a well-established 
phenomenon in colleges and universities. In fact, approximately 40% of all 2-year and 4-
year public institutions of higher education have some form of collective bargaining 
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(Cassell, 2012). Some of these bargaining arrangements are carried out under the NLRA 
(i.e., private colleges and universities) while other bargaining arrangements are carried 
out under state labor laws (i.e., public colleges and universities). The NLRA prohibition 
against worker council systems is repeated in most state labor laws that are closely 
modeled after the NLRA. 
Nevertheless, despite these prohibitions a significant number of higher education 
collective bargaining contracts acknowledge and even legitimize a “shared environment” 
for the faculty union and the higher education equivalent of a works council, a faculty 
senate (Bucklew, Houghton, & Ellison, 2011). The higher education “industry” has 
accommodated a faculty collective bargaining system that coexists in many cases with a 
faculty or academic senate that provides faculty with a structured involvement in the 
shared governance of the institution. There are different approaches or models to this 
shared environment for unions and senates (Bucklew et al., 2011). The important 
conclusion is that in many academic collective bargaining arrangements the unions and 
the employers have established and recognized roles for both the traditional labor union 
and the faculty senate, effectively a form of works council.  
It seems that this experiment in higher education collective bargaining might 
provide models for the further development of works council type organizations in other 
“industries,” thereby expanding the practice of extended worker involvement that is 
spreading in use around the globe. In short, the higher education bargaining experience 
suggests that it might be timely to revisit this area of labor law on both the federal and 
state level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the shared governance traditions in 
U.S. higher education in the context of the global models of employee representation, 
including works councils and codetermination. We begin with an overview of employee 
representation legislation and practices worldwide, before contrasting these with U.S. 
labor law and practices. We then examine the unique governance structure of U.S. higher 
education as an exception to U.S. traditional law and practices. We conclude by 
examining the implications of this example for public policy and employment practices in 
the U.S.  
Works Councils and Codetermination in Practice 
 Over the past two decades the phenomenon of works councils and 
codetermination has been an important global development in worker participation in 
business organizations. This movement was grounded in Germany and the German 
Works Council Act of 1920. Works councils are legally mandated, corporate governing 
bodies that consist of equal representation of owners and employees. The concept spread 
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to other European countries and each developed its own version of this arrangement. 
Examples include:  Germany—a two level system with worker involvement related to 
business decisions; France—an employee advisory mechanism with a management 
representative chairing the council; and Denmark and Belgium—a council made up of 
management and employee representatives.  
In Germany, employees are given control rights through seats on the corporate 
board (Gorton & Schmid, 2004). German labor law, specifically the Montan 
Codetermination Act of 1951, requires that the supervisory board have an equal number 
of employee and shareholder representatives (Gorton & Schmid, 2004). Additional laws 
include the Works Council Act of 1952, the Works Council Act of 1972, and the 
Codetermination Act of 1976, which governs corporations with more than 2,000 
employees (Gorton & Schmid, 2004).  
The advent of the European Union (EU) resulted in EU Directive 94/34/EC in 1994, 
which mandated a European Works Council structure for any company with more than 
1000 employees with at least 150 in each of 2 countries (Addison & Belfield, 2002) . In 
2002, another EU directive established requirements that each EU member country 
develop legislation covering employers with more than 50 employees and requiring an 
“inform and consult” or “inform and consent” system for employee codetermination. 
Codetermination is a legal requirement that the suppliers of equity capital and the 
suppliers of labor run the firm together (Gorton & Schmid, 2004). Codetermination rests 
on the issue of control. Will the organization be controlled only by the shareholders, or 
will the employees also have a say in the control of the corporation?  Under 
codetermination, the corporation is controlled by both the shareholders and the 
employees (Gorton & Schmid, 2004). Under another EU arrangement, a company doing 
business in several EU countries could form a “European Company” and have one 
European-wide works council. 
 The expansion of works council arrangements has spread beyond Europe. In some 
cases, the exportation of the works council concept pre-dates the EU developments. Japan 
is one of the earliest examples. In more recent years, a number of nations including 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Thailand and South Africa have adopted some form of works 
councils. Many global firms with operations in Europe have been introduced to this type 
of employee involvement and input, leading to the possible adoption of works councils in 
their non-European operations. Across Europe and in many other countries with labor 
union traditions, there is a functional co-existence of collective bargaining and systems of 
worker participation. These countries have arranged for this co-existence by having 
mutually compatible labor laws and worker representation laws. 
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In the United States, the primary goal of for-profit organizations tends to be the 
maximizing of shareholder value. In Europe, however, works councils and 
codetermination tend to allow for the maximization of employee interests as well 
(Dammann, 2003). In Germany, for example, corporate law protects the interests of both 
shareholders and employees (Dammann, 2003). Works councils and codetermination 
give employees power and offer some protection in the design and implementation of 
work systems (Duggan & Duggan, 2004). Indeed, these types of arrangements require 
organizations to be more socially responsible and proactive in planning for the well-being 
of their employees (FitzRoy & Kraft, 1993).  
Costs and Benefits 
Much of the employee representation literature focuses on performance. 
Specifically, have works councils and codetermination made things better or worse for 
organizations and their employees?  Our review of the literature finds no clear consensus. 
For instance, early studies show that codetermination in Germany may have reduced 
profitability, but may also have increased job security and reduced the social and 
adjustment costs of unemployment (FitzRoy & Kraft, 1993). Gorton & Smith (2004) 
provide evidence that equal representation may have a substantial effect on firm value, 
concluding that “equal representation appears to be a binding constraint on the 
shareholders” (p. 895) . In addition, researchers have found a positive association 
between a works council’s presence and plant closings (Addison, Bellmann, & Kölling, 
2004). Another study suggests that although works councils may not increase 
productivity, there is nevertheless some evidence to indicate that they increase employee 
voice and information sharing (Fairris & Askenazy, 2010). Furthermore, research 
suggests that works councils provide more security and a lower separation rate into 
unemployment or non-employment (Hirsch, Schank, & Schnabel, 2010). 
On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that works councils may 
actually increase income, although not necessarily security (Beckmann, Föhr, & Kräkel, 
2010). Indeed, one study found that productivity and profitability increase when 
codetermination is introduced (Renaud, 2007), while others have argued that the low-
level participation required by codetermination leads to increases in productivity 
(Hodgson & Jones, 1989). Works councils involve a complex network with several 
different actors (Köhler & Begega, 2010) and may also have an effect on trust and 
identity (Timming, 2006), while providing motivation for employees (Jirjahn & Smith, 
2006). Nevertheless, some employees may choose not to elect works councils, possibly 
because of a lack of transparency in the organization or the perception of little value 
added by works councils (Whittall, Lücking, & Trinczek, 2009). Some have even 
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suggested that works councils may have no influence on productivity one way or the 
other (Addison & Belfield, 2002). For instance, one study found no evidence of works 
councils affecting firm capital whatsoever (Addison, Schank, Schnabel, & Wagner, 
2007).  
Clearly, the impact of worker representation on firm performance is not well 
understood (Addison, 2005).  As Addision, Schnabel, and Wagner (2004) suggest, “it 
would appear to be the case that, on net, either the early literature encouraged an overly 
negative view of the impact of works councils, or else the functioning of works councils 
has improved since then” ( p. 277). Firm performance may depend on the relationships of 
the representatives on the board, and also on the attitudes and values of those 
representatives (Berg, Grift, & Witteloostuijn, 2011), who may actually be citizens of 
different nations (Bicknell & Knudsen, 2006).  
Works Councils, Unions, and Multi-National Corporations 
Works councils function independently from employee unions and  may lead to 
increased employee voice (Bailey, 2009). Unions, however, may influence representative 
candidate nominations (Addison, 2005) and several potential issues involving solidarity 
and identity building should be considered (Banyuls, Haipeter, & Neumann, 2008). In 
turn, works councils may be beneficial to unions and their members may also influence 
union membership (Behrens, 2009). In some situations, works councils could potentially 
serve as a substitute for non-union employee representation, although union workers may 
have higher expectations for works councils (Dong-One & Hyun-Ki, 2004). Works 
councils may have a positive effect on wages in collective bargaining in some 
circumstances (Hübler & Jirjahn, 2003).   Nonetheless, unions are more often associated 
with gaining higher wages, while works councils tend to be more often associated with 
higher levels of job satisfaction (Kleiner & Young-Myon, 1997). The relationship 
between unions and works councils can be complicated and it is influenced by many 
factors, including economic conditions and the strength of the union (French, 2001). 
To some extent, works councils have evolved in response to increases in 
multinational corporations (MNC) (Contrepois & Jefferys, 2010). Works councils are 
limited by the power and the decision making processes of the organizations (Gilson & 
Weiler, 2008) and the character of a particular works council may be largely determined 
by the interplay of ‘country of origin’ factors and ‘country of location’ factors (Hall, 
Hoffmann, Marginson, & Müller, 2003). There are times when a works council has great 
influence and times when it provides more of a rubber stamp (Hann, 1975). One potential 
problem in the context of employee representation is the notion of “real seat,”  an 
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established principle under European labor law which dictates that corporations will be 
governed by the laws of the country in which they are headquartered (Dammann, 2003). 
However, in a recent case (Centros Ltd.) the court’s ruling implied that freedom of 
establishment should be paramount (Dammann, 2003). This opens up the possibility that 
new corporations may be less likely to establish their headquarters in countries with 
strong codetermination laws.  
The United States Legal Tradition for Employee Involvement In The Determination 
of Working Conditions 
 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes the exclusive bargaining 
agent concept. There are several ways a union can gain this status but by far the most 
dominant manner is through a secret ballot election. If a union wins such an election, it is 
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for that unit of employees. The union is the 
sole agent to represent the employees in regard to many central issue of employment 
within that firm. Section 9(a) of the NLRA creates the “exclusivity doctrine,” and it 
prohibits employers from bargaining with any other organization (Alexander, 1988). The 
act creates a set of prohibited practices both for the employer and the union. One critical 
prohibited practice (deemed an unfair labor practice or ULP under the act) for an 
employer is that they cannot dominate or interfere with the formation of any organization 
of employees concerned with issues of employment. This legal restriction prohibits the 
employer from creating councils or other organizations of employees. The employer is 
required to work only with the elected exclusive bargaining agent or union (Hogler, 
2007). There has been some limited areas where worker “advise and consent” has been 
adopted by the company. If these arrangements have been instituted in a plant with an 
exclusive bargaining agent the pattern is that the arrangement requires union concurrence. 
This is particularly true if the issue involves working conditions and standards. 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has ruled on a number of cases (that 
subsequently have been upheld by the courts) that the prohibition against employer 
domination or support of any labor organization applies to arrangements such as works 
councils. The seminal case, Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990[1992],enfd.35F.3d 1148 
[7th Cir. 1994], establishes a narrow set of legal parameters governing situations that 
could be described as a company attempting to introduce an adapted version of a works 
council. In this case, the company was ordered to disband a series of worker-management 
committees that were dealing with issues such as absenteeism, communications, pay 
progression, and attendance bonuses. In 2001, the NLRB in the case of Crown Cork and 
Seal, NLRB No.92 [July 2001] provided some additional guidance on the matter of 
employee committees created by the employer. The essence of this decision was that if 
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the committee is truly advisory and does not enter into any type of codetermination 
arrangement, there might be some leeway for employers to establish such committees 
without violating the law. There have been attempts to modify the NLRA in this area by 
passage of a new statute. Indeed, Congress actually passed such a law, the TEAM act of 
1996, but it was vetoed by President Clinton. United States labor law and its 
interpretation continue to provide a major stumbling block to the introduction of works 
council types of arrangements into American business practices.  
U.S. Higher Education Academic Governance: The Exception to the Rule 
 Faculty governance in American higher education is a form of codetermination 
quite unique among worker involvement patterns in private industry and public 
employment. For over a century many U.S. colleges and universities have used a 
governance model that provides an extensive (and on some matters, an exclusive) 
decision making role for faculty. In most four year colleges and universities, both public 
and private, this “shared governance” model of management is firmly established. Many 
institutions have formalized this model in their constitution and policy statements. In 
others it is reflected in decades of practice. 
Under this model faculty are viewed as key advisors on a broad array of 
institutional policies and practices. For example, faculty input (and even approval) is 
assumed for executive level appointments. This is particularly true for department chairs, 
deans, and academic executive administrators. The central “product” of an institution of 
higher education is its academic programs and degrees. In this area, faculty dominance is 
assured by a shared governance model. Few four year institutions would offer a degree 
program without review and approval by the appropriate faculty governance mechanism. 
Through this system of shared governance, most institutions of higher education in the 
United States have adopted a variant of the works council system. The title most often 
used is Faculty Senate. Other names and similar models of faculty involvement in 
governance are used [Academic Senate, University Senate] but for purposes of this 
analysis we use the term Faculty Senate. This body is normally a representative, elected 
council through which the faculty role in shared governance is performed. The senior 
management of the institution consults regularly with the Senate. Their advice and 
counsel is sought and valued. On some matters, the position of the Faculty Senate is 
considered determining or at least highly influential. 
 Since the early 1970s, faculty unionization has become an alternate or competing 
model of faculty involvement in the life of a college or university. Public colleges and 
universities located in states with an enabling collective bargaining statute are now 
7
Bucklew et al.: Shared Governance & Academic Collective Bargaining
Published by The Keep, 2013
offered the option of using a labor-management negotiating system. Private colleges , if 
covered, are covered by the National Labor Relations Act rather than by state level 
legislation.  During the 1970s and 1980s, there was an extensive unionization effort 
within higher education institutions under the NLRA. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in the case NLRB vs. Yeshiva University, stating in their decision that the national 
labor law did not apply to almost all full-time faculty in private colleges because they 
participated as managers of the institution through the shared governance system. This 
decision has essentially remained in place and has resulted in a clear decline of private 
college unionization.  
The Impact of Faculty Unionization on Shared Governance and Faculty Senates 
 The exclusive bargaining agent concept underlying collective bargaining in the 
United States has led to pressure and potential conflict with the shared governance (e.g., 
Faculty Senate) tradition. The codetermination and works council systems that are so 
strong in Europe and growing globally have not flourished in the United States. A key 
factor is the enabling labor laws at the federal and state levels. These laws create an 
exclusive bargaining agent arrangement for the union. As outlined above, in most cases 
these laws actually prohibit management endorsed or aided employee organizations. 
Nevertheless, shared governance models on most campuses predate the faculty union 
movement and in many instances have been allowed to co-exist with faculty unions.  
After four decades of academic collective bargaining in American higher education, 
a number of arrangements have evolved relative to how or whether faculty unions will 
co-exist with shared governance traditions. In a recent review and conceptual paper, 
Bucklew and his colleagues (2011) identified four models of faculty unionization and 
shared governance. These models not only provide a framework for understanding the 
co-existence of faculty unions and shared governance, they also show how these 
boundaries are defined in collective bargaining agreements. In the comprehensive model, 
both traditional labor-management contract issues and shared governance issues are 
addressed in the contract. Here, the union fulfills the primary faculty representation role 
in place of traditional faculty governance, such as the faculty senate. In this model, 
matters that were traditionally decided by the faculty senate are now explicitly spelled out 
in the collective bargaining agreement. These matters would include:  wages, promotion 
and tenure, teaching load, academic rank (job classification), peer evaluation committees 
and processes, academic governance advisory process, retirement policies, pension 
programs, health insurance, life and disability, insurances, sick leave, vacation and 
holidays, and academic freedom rights and responsibilities (Bucklew et al., 2011).  
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 The second model is the codetermination model. In this model, parties negotiate 
over traditional collective bargaining topics, but also create enabling language in the 
contract concerning the continuation of shared governance activities (Bucklew et al., 
2011). Here, language exists in the contract that authorizes faculty senates to continue to 
oversee traditional governance items, such as promotion and tenure processes, teaching 
load, and curriculum committee structures. This model allows traditional faculty senates 
to exist and function in a similar manner to works councils.  
 The third or permissive model also addresses traditional labor issues (Bucklew et 
al., 2011). However, references in the collective bargaining agreement to faculty 
governance issues are less explicit. Here, the faculty senate may be mentioned in the 
contract, and its traditional role as a governing body is acknowledged. However, the 
parameters and boundaries of traditional faculty governance are not established.  
 The fourth and final model is the restricted or limited model (Bucklew et al., 
2011). In this model, the collective bargaining agreement is silent on matters that are 
traditionally handled by the faculty senate. There is no language in the contract to address 
how these issues will be decided; instead, the contract only addresses traditional labor 
topics, such as wages, benefits, etc. This model may be adopted voluntarily, or, in some 
cases, it may be mandated by law. 
            It is important to note that under most of these models, the employer and 
exclusive bargaining agent (i.e., union) have agreed to include a role for the faculty 
senate (i.e., another employee organization). They have done so using different 
approaches, but under the prevailing NLRB interpretation of a prohibited practice these 
arrangements could not have been implemented only by the employer and required the 
agreement or at the least quiet acceptance of the union. There is no record of unfair labor 
practice allegations on this matter.  It is not clear whether or not employers in other 
“industries” that do not have the long tradition of shared governance found in higher 
education could insist on such worker participation arrangements. It is also doubtful that 
they would normally be successful in gaining union agreement with contract language 
providing for such processes. 
          In short, the higher education experience serves as a clear example that 
unions and a works council type arrangement (i.e., faculty senate) can function 
successfully in the United States. It shows that unions and worker participation 
arrangements similar to those developing on a global basis can work in the United States. 
What is not clear is whether this experience can be transferred to other industries under 
the current legal framework. 
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Potential Implications and Conclusions  
Shared governance in U.S. higher education is a long established form of employee 
representation. This long and valued tradition of codetermination in central policy and 
practice along with the use of a type of works council arrangement (i.e., the faculty 
senate) may serve as a model for other U.S. industries and organizations. For example, it 
would appear to be a reasonable fit for hospitals, legal firms, higher level law 
enforcement, firms in the knowledge industry, and other organizations using primarily 
highly technical and professional employees. As the case of higher education 
demonstrates, faculty unions and shared governance structures may not only co-exist, 
they can, in many respects, have a symbiotic or mutually beneficial relationship 
(Bucklew et al., 2011).  
How might the U.S. higher education experience with shared governance provide 
an avenue for expansion of global initiatives in employee representation? Some states are 
considering the modification (or even elimination) of their historical labor law structure. 
The result in some instances may be to provide no structured alternative for employee 
involvement in the development and functioning of the company. One such alternative 
could be built based on the relatively successful and symbiotic models of co-existence 
between unions and works councils in higher education. It is important to note, however, 
that this approach would require some modification of the exclusive bargaining agent 
arrangement. Another alternative could be to fully authorize organizations to develop and 
support employee representation arrangements for their employees through the creation 
of work councils by the employer. This option might be of particular interest for states 
with no traditional labor law that wanted to establish a process leading to more employee 
representation in the workplace. 
In conclusion, the case of shared governance traditions in U.S. higher education 
provides an instructive example of the potential for employee representation in the form 
of works councils and codetermination in the United States even when the faculty have a 
union in place. The experience in higher education governance may provide an effective 
framework that has the potential to serve as a foundation for the development of works 
council types of arrangements in other industries, effectively expanding the worker 
involvement and representation practices that are becoming increasingly popular 
worldwide. Although it could require changes to existing labor law at both the federal 
and state level, we suggest that policy makers carefully consider the potential advantages 
of these types of shared governance arrangements and pursue the necessary legal 
structural changes required to help facilitate worker participation in the United States on 
a wider scale. 
10




Addison, J. T. 2005. The determinants of firm performance: Unions, works councils, and 
employee involvement/high-performance work practices. Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 52(3): 406-50. 
 
Addison, J. T. & Belfield, C. R. 2002. What do we know about the new european works 
councils? Some preliminary evidence from britain. Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 49(4): 418-44. 
 
Addison, J. T., Bellmann, L., & Kölling, A. 2004. Works councils and plant closings in 
germany. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 42(1): 125-48. 
 
Addison, J. T., Schank, T., Schnabel, C., & Wagner, J. 2007. Do works councils inhibit 
investment? Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 60(2): 187-203. 
 
Addison, J. T., Schnabel, C., & Wagner, J. 2004. The course of research into the 
economic consequences of german works councils. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 42(2): 255-81. 
 
Alexander, K. O. 1988. Worker participation and the law once again: overview and 
evaluation. Labor Law Journal, 39(10): 696-703. 
 
Bailey, M. 2009. Can you hear us? The effectiveness of European Works Councils as a 
mechanism of employee voice for Hungarian workers of PrintCo. Employee 
Relations, 31(2): 197-218. 
 
Banyuls, J., Haipeter, T., & Neumann, L. 2008. European Works Council at General 
Motors Europe: Bargaining efficiency in regime competition? Industrial Relations 
Journal, 39(6): 532-47. 
 
Beckmann, M., Föhr, S., & Kräkel, M. 2010. Rent seeking, employment security, and 
works councils: Theory and evidence for germany. Schmalenbach Business Review 
(SBR), 62(1): 2-40. 
 
Behrens, M. 2009. Still married after all these years? Union organizing and the role of 
works councils in german industrial relations. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 
62(3): 275-93. 
 
Berg, A., Grift, Y., & Witteloostuijn, A. 2011. Works councils and organizational 
performance. Journal of Labor Research, 32(2): 136-56. 
 
Bicknell, H. & Knudsen, H. 2006. Comparing german and danish employee 
representatives on european works councils: Do differences in national background 
matter? Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(4): 435-51. 
 
11
Bucklew et al.: Shared Governance & Academic Collective Bargaining
Published by The Keep, 2013
Bucklew, N., Houghton, J. D., Ellison, C.N. 2011. Academic collective bargaining and its 
impact on traditional faculty governance systems, AAUP SharedGovernance 
Conference and Workshops. Washington, DC. 
 
Cassell, M. K. 2012. Teachers’ unions and costs in the 21st century university, Issues for 
Universities in the 21st Century. Madison, Wisconsin. 
 
Contrepois, S. & Jefferys, S. 2010. European works councils in central and eastern 
europe: Varieties of institution building among French service sector 
multinationals. Industrial Relations Journal, 41(6): 584-602. 
 
Dammann, J. C. 2003. The future of codetermination after centros: Will german 
corporate law move closer to the u.s. model? Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law, 8(2): 607. 
 
Dong-One, K. & Hyun-Ki, K. 2004. A comparison of the effectiveness of unions and 
non-union works councils in Korea: Can non-union employee representation 
substitute for trade unionism? International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 15(6): 1069-93. 
 
Duggan, E. W. & Duggan, D. K. 2004. Employee rights and participation in the design of 
information systems in the european union and the united states: Codetermination 
laws and voluntary participation. Journal of Individual Employment Rights, 11(4): 
313-31. 
 
Fairris, D. & Askenazy, P. 2010. Works councils and firm productivity in France. 
Journal of Labor Research, 31(3): 209-29. 
 
FitzRoy, F. R. & Kraft, K. 1993. Economic effects of codetermination. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 95(3): 365. 
 
French, S. 2001. Works councils in unified Germany: Still loyal to the trade unions? 
International Journal of Manpower, 22(6): 560. 
 
Gilson, C. & Weiler, A. 2008. Transnational company industrial relations: The role of 
European works councils and the implications for international human resource 
management. Journal of Industrial Relations, 50(5): 697-717. 
 
Gorton, G. & Schmid, F. A. 2004. Capital, labor, and the firm: A study of german 
codetermination. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(5): 863-905. 
 
Hall, M., Hoffmann, A., Marginson, P., & Müller, T. 2003. National influences on 
European works councils in UK- and US-based companies. Human Resource 
Management Journal, 13(4): 75-92. 
 
Hann, P. 1975. How a works council works. Management Review, 64(4): 43. 
12
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol4/iss1/3
Hirsch, B., Schank, T., & Schnabel, C. 2010. Works councils and separations: Voice, 
monopoly, and insurance effects. Industrial Relations, 49(4): 566-92. 
 
Hodgson, G. M. & Jones, D. C. 1989. Codetermination: A partial review of theory and 
evidence. Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 60(3): 329. 
 
Hogler, R. 2007. Exclusive representation and the wagner act: The structure of federal 
collective bargaining law. Labor Law Journal, 58(3): 157-69. 
 
Hübler, O. & Jirjahn, U. 2003. Works councils and collective bargaining in germany: The 
impact on productivity and wages. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 50(4): 
471. 
 
Jirjahn, U. W. E. & Smith, S. C. 2006. What factors lead management to support or 
oppose employee participation—with and without works councils? Hypotheses and 
evidence from Germany. Industrial Relations, 45(4): 650-80. 
 
Kleiner, M. M. & Young-Myon, L. 1997. Works councils and unionization: Lessons from 
South Korea. Industrial Relations, 36(1): 1. 
 
Köhler, H.-D. & Begega, S. G. 2010. The European works council as a multidimensional 
contested terrain. Employee Relations, 32(6): 590-605. 
 
Renaud, S. 2007. Dynamic efficiency of supervisory board codetermination in Germany. 
LABOUR: Review of Labour Economics & Industrial Relations, 21(4/5): 689-712. 
 
Timming, A. R. 2006. The problem of identity and trust in European works councils. 
Employee Relations, 28(1): 9-25. 
 
Whittall, M., Lücking, S., & Trinczek, R. 2009. The frontiers within: Why employee 
representatives fail to set up European works councils. Industrial Relations Journal, 
40(6): 546-62. 
13
Bucklew et al.: Shared Governance & Academic Collective Bargaining
Published by The Keep, 2013
